Humanitarian Aid in Question: The Case of Rice Imports to Haiti by Potter, Madeleine R
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship
2013
Humanitarian Aid in Question: The Case of Rice
Imports to Haiti
Madeleine R. Potter
Scripps College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Potter, Madeleine R., "Humanitarian Aid in Question: The Case of Rice Imports to Haiti" (2013). Scripps Senior Theses. Paper 225.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/225
  
 
 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID IN QUESTION: 
THE CASE OF RICE IMPORTS TO HAITI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
MADELEINE POTTER 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO SCRIPPS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS  
 
 
PROFESSOR ROSELLI 
PROFESSOR DENISE-SHELTON 
 
 
 
 
26 APRIL, 2013 
Potter 2 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CH.1: INTRODUCTION: RICE AID IN HAITI 
 
CH. 2: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HAITI: A TALE OF OCCUPATION 
 
CH.3: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND ITS ROLE IN HAITI  
 
CH. 4: THE GENERAL EFFECTS OF RICE AID ON RURAL HAITIAN  
SOCIETY  
THE EFFECT ON THE “POTO MITAN” OF HAITI, THE WOMEN 
 
CH. 5: A CALLING FOR A RE-POLITICIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN  
AID: A CONCLUSION 
 
WORK CITED 
Potter 3 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 
I would first like to thank my parents, who never cease to inspire me 
and make me realize the person I can be.  I am so grateful for both of you and 
love, love, love you!  Secondly, to my readers – Professor Roselli, thank you for 
Zizek!  He changed my life!  Also thanks for being excited about my topic; it 
kept me going.  Professor Shelton – thank you for being patient with me when 
it seemed I was not even writing a thesis.  Je vous remercie beaucoup pour ça, 
mais aussi pour votre conseil sage et toujours pour avoir un bon sens de 
l’humeur.  Nos rires me faisaient du bien.  I definitely could not have done this 
without you two!  Lastly, I want to acknowledge all of the people who have 
and are continuing to expose global structural inequalities despite there 
existing no concrete answer on how to solve them.  Knowledge is power and 
everything is political!
Potter 4 
INTRODUCTION: RICE AID IN HAITI 
The face of hunger took the world stage in April 2008 when Haitians converged 
in Port-au-Prince to protest the rising cost of food.  Essential staples, including rice, have 
escalated up by 50 percent in the previous year. Haitians, many of whom live on $2 a 
day, joined protestors across the globe in response to a worldwide increase in food prices.  
In the southern city of Les Cayes, clashes between civilians and the Haitian United 
Nations forces, Minustah, left four dead.  The thousands of protesters that marched to 
Port-au-Prince’s National Palace did so peacefully, though vocally (The Associated 
Press).  While rooted in many factors, the intense and widespread hunger in Haiti has 
worsened in the past three decades due to increased rice exports from the U.S.  A staple 
in the Haitian diet, rice has provided a livelihood for many farmers for decades.  
However, with the advent of U.S. rice imports, many Haitian rice farmers lost their jobs; 
their rice could not compete with the heavily subsidized rice from Arkansas or Miami.  
How has such humanitarian aid shifted rural dynamics, particularly in regards to gender, 
labor and land ownership?  Furthermore, how has this instance in Haiti revealed wealthy 
nations’ contradicted commitment to human rights? 
The issue of rice in Haiti intrigued me from a theoretical perspective.  That is, 
I wanted to understand the social dynamics of the global food market.  Why does 
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Haiti continue to be the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere when it receives 
a great deal of aid?  I wanted to know why Haiti receives tons of rice imports from 
USAID when rice constitutes a staple in the Haitian diet.  Why would a country 
import a staple grown on its own land?  It appeared to me to be illogical.  This led 
me to question the potential role rice aid, and by extension humanitarian aid, has 
played in preventing Haiti from succeeding it in the global market in large part due 
to an unstable central government.   Furthermore, why has poverty remained at a 
critical level when copious pounds of rice have been delivered to Haiti?  Such a 
question prompted me to wonder about the consequences of this ineffective 
humanitarian aid on the woman in rural Haiti whose land provided a means of 
subsistence but also of income.  This drove me to question the broader social 
implications of humanitarian aid.  
The effects of U.S. rice imports to Haiti have been disastrous, falling the 
hardest on the poor, peasant woman.  Ever since the Woodrow Wilson’s invasion of 
Haiti and restructuring of the constitution, the West, primarily embodied by the 
United States, has continued to dominate Haitian politics and in turn has largely 
contributed to its fractured structure today.  Largely infertile soil, remnants of the 
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French occupation, complicates farming as does primitive farming tools1.  However, 
instead of providing modern, more efficient farming machinery, international donor 
agencies choose to fund corrupt governments and export goods from their own 
country.  In the case of rice, the U.S. provided rice when there was no urgent need of 
rice, a political move that ended up financially benefiting the U.S. 
Unsurprisingly, at face value, humanitarian aid seems to represent the 
benevolence of global powers that seek to selflessly give back to countries not as 
well off.  Each component of the term, humanitarian and aid, lead the uninformed 
bystander to logically support such an endeavor.  The problem, however, is that 
such an understanding of humanitarian aid is over-simplistic and paradoxical the 
majority of the time.  As the ancient Chinese aphorism says, "give a man a fish and 
you feed him for a day.  Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime," 
(Danielson).  This brings me to the question of why food aid, and humanitarian aid 
on a larger scale, has failed to elicit positive change in Haiti when countries and 
organizations have donated billions of dollars toward reconstruction. 
My thesis deals with four key terms in the modern-day world economy: 
                                                        
1 The “West” represents the nations from which the dominant capitalist ideology 
originated.  The West has benefitted by exploiting those who have not embraced, at 
least successfully, the capitalist framework of their political economy. 
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neoliberalism, neoimperialism, human rights, and humanitarian aid.  David Harvey 
defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2).  Arising from three distinct 
regions, China, the U.S., and England, neoliberalism emerged in the global political 
scene in the late 1970s, early 1980s.  Since then, the global economy has adopted 
neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization that reinforce a distrust of 
government intervention, a distrust that is embodied in Haiti by the thousands of 
NGOs.  Financial success within the global market now instinctually motivates 
individuals and institutions alike while functioning to further enhance the class 
structure.  Though seemingly allowing anyone to succeed by protecting them from 
uninformed and biased state intervention, the principles of neoliberalism only cater 
to a select portion of society who already possesses the means and access necessary 
for achievement in the global market.  In no way do rural Haitians fall under this 
elite category, making them instantly exploitable by those who do constitute the 
privileged, neoliberal minority.  Using David Harvey’s analysis of neoliberalism as a 
lens, I argue that rice imports are indicative of a neoliberal global framework that 
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compensates for its lack of ethics with ingenious methods of material and human 
exploitation.  In the case of Haiti, this has led to a disenfranchised rural population 
that no longer has autonomy over their own labor. 
Slavoj Zizek’s “Against Human Rights” contends that the West depoliticizes 
humanitarian intervention.  Yet, how can humanitarian intervention not be political 
when its basis of existence relies upon the notion of universal human rights?  Zizek 
posits that human rights comprise a category created and exploited by powerful 
countries to maintain the liberal capitalist world order.  Zizek dismantles Europe’s 
process of modernization that continuously involves getting rid of old ideals that in 
turn arrive at “developing” countries.   Wanting to modernize in order to keep up 
with the global economic order, the countries receiving dismissed methods of 
progress follow suit often in the form of genocide to cleanse the country, so to speak, 
of that which is keeping it back from success in the global order.  Zizek reminds the 
reader that “…the two great ethnic crimes imputed to the Turks in the 20th 
century—the Armenian genocide and the persecution of the Kurds—were not 
committed by traditionalist Muslim political forces, but by the military modernizers 
who sought to cut Turkey loose from its old-world ballast and turn it into a 
European nation-state,” (116).  Referencing Hegel’s concept of “reflexive 
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determination,” Zizek explains how humanitarian intervention functions to come to 
grips with modernization (116).  In other words, when providing humanitarian aid 
to a country that is involved in genocide, Europe’s remaining guilt is absolved 
because they are now doing their part to prevent genocide.  This ripple-like effect of 
modernization relies upon globalization and therefore continues to occur.  Another 
point crucial to my thesis is Zizek’s notion of “anti-political politics,” (126).   “Not 
only is violence the necessary supplement of power, but power itself is always-
already at the root of every apparently ‘non-political’ relationship of violence… The 
task of critical analysis is to discern the hidden political process that sustains all 
these ‘non’ or ‘pre’-political relationships.  In human society, the political is the 
encompassing structuring principle, so that every neutralization of some partial 
content as ‘non-political’ is a political gesture par excellence,” (125).  Not realizing 
the political nature of humanitarian aid can lead to real problems not being dealt 
with correctly.  For example, after the earthquake, though aid was flowing in by the 
millions of dollars, where did this money go?  Even today, virtually no one knows 
(Assistance Mortelle).  Globalization has created an environment in which the West 
continuously responds to the problems they were vital in introducing. 
Jacques Rancière asserts that human rights experienced a rebirth in the 
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1970s to 1980s.  Incidentally, the same time neoliberalism emerged in the global 
stage.  The end of the Cold War did not bring about the utopia theorists like Marx 
had predicted.  Instead, the “Inhuman,” surfaced next to the rethinking of good and 
evil, two concepts heavily laden with ideology as well as polarizing (297).  
Rights of Man turned out to be the rights of the rightless… the rights of the 
victims, the rights of those who were unable to enact any rights or even any 
claim in their name, so that eventually their rights had to be upheld by 
others, at the cost of shattering the edifice of International Rights, in the 
name of a new right to ‘humanitarian interference’ –which ultimately boiled 
down to the right to invasion (Rancière 297-298).   
The “Rights of Man” evolved into the Human Rights now associated with the ethical 
basis for humanitarian intervention, which works to mask the politics that 
prompted such an intervention.  Rancière contends that human rights arise from 
radical political praxis.  In this way he gives credit to the political subject that 
recognizes the inequality in their rights and therefore fights for them.  It is through 
this process that the state recognizes people’s rights that they once denied.  The 
problem with humanitarian intervention is that powerful countries have donated, so 
to speak, the ambiguous term of human rights that continues to fail in preventing 
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“evil.”  Each time a genocide happens or a natural disaster, global powers will 
intervene to return human rights that had, in a sense, been “returned to the sender,” 
the global power who must in turn reenact them for those that cannot enact them by 
themselves (308).  Like Zizek, Rancière calls for an ontological reassessment of 
human rights and to whom they pertain.  
The instance of rice aid in Haiti definitively demands a reevaluation of 
humanitarian aid in today's world.  In this thesis, I will outline the effects of rice aid 
on Haitian society and theoretically analyze humanitarian aid’s presence in 
“developing” countries.2  In addition to ruining many Haitian farmers' livelihoods, 
rice imports have aggravated Haiti's economic situation and national stability, the 
consequences of which have fallen primarily on the poor woman.  I focus on the 
effects on the peasant woman in this thesis.  Food insecurity remains a crisis.  
Throughout my thesis, I draw from the texts of scholars Slavoj Zizek, Jacques 
Rancière, and Noam Chomsky, in order to attempt at understanding what is really 
going on here.  Such theorists illuminate the historical and theoretical analysis of 
                                                        
2 I am cognizant that the term “developing” country derives from a systematically 
repressive and dominant ideology.  I use it only to signify the global hegemonic 
structure that continues to exploit countries, like Haiti, and lock them into a fragile state 
of severe poverty and dependence. 
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humanitarian aid and the concept of human rights that said-aid seeks to protect.  
The purpose of my thesis is to shed new light on the business of humanitarian aid, 
using rice in Haiti as a case study of sorts.  I seek to uncover the role international 
donor institutions have played in reinforcing the fragile state in Haiti as a result of 
rice aid, arguing that humanitarian aid has done more to prevent than to inspire 
sustainable progress in Haiti especially in rural Haiti that continually gets hit the 
hardest during economic crises such as the one brought on by humanitarian aid in 
the form of rice.3 
 
                                                        
3 Humanitarian aid includes food aid. 
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CHAPTER 2:  A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF HAITI: A TALE OF 
OCCUPATION 
 Rice aid provides one instance in a long list of exploitative practices 
throughout Haiti’s existence as an independent nation.  In fact, to even call Haiti 
independent seems like a half-truth.  Just under 25 years ago, the first 
democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, returned to Haiti 
from exile.  Simultaneously, exports from the U.S. to Haiti skyrocketed despite 
Haiti’s near self-sufficiency in domestically cultivated rice.  Rice farmers soon 
experienced the repercussions of this political and economic move as cheap, heavily 
subsidized rice flowed in from Arkansas and Miami.  Though the poorest country in 
the Western Hemisphere, Haiti soon became the fourth largest importer of 
American rice, after Japan, Mexico, and Canada. Haitian-produced rice now only 
accounts for 20-30% of in-country rice consumption (Gauthier 1, Lindsay 23).  
However, before Haiti was an infertile, impoverished nation, it was a lush, 
prosperous island.  In fact, when Europeans first conquered the island over 500 
years ago, they described the island as a “virtual paradise: opulent, peaceful, densely 
populated, rich in resources,” almost the opposite of how one would depict present-
day Haiti (Farmer 17).  In December 1492, Christopher Columbus established the 
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first European settlement in the New World on the northern strip of the island 
Columbus named Hispaniola.  The natives of this northern section, Ayiti, “high 
country” in Arawak, welcomed Columbus and his men with open arms, only to be 
met with disease, slavery, and categorical massacre (53).  Though portrayed by 
Columbus himself as “lovable, tractable, peaceable, gentle, decorous Indians,” the 
original population of Haiti perished at a staggeringly quick rate.  A people of eight 
million at the close of the 15th century, their size dropped to 50,000 in 1510 and to 
almost zero in the late 17th century when the French seized the colony from the 
Spanish (54).  The transformation of Haiti started with the purge of the indigenous 
population. 
 “Haiti’s agony began with the success of the plantation colony, it was the 
richest in the hemisphere” (Stoll 7).  As Stephen Stoll elucidates in his article, 
“Towards a Second Haitian Revolution,” Haiti’s historic plight began with the 
French’s successful launch of a plantation economy in Haiti.  The western third of 
Hispaniola, the French colony of Saint Dominigue, cultivated coffee, sugar, and 
cotton utilizing slaves from West Africa.  In 1791, however, this institution collapsed 
at the hands of the very people it enslaved.  Inspired by Enlightenment ideals, the 
slaves victoriously fought back against their colonial masters, killing most of them, 
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and defended themselves against British and French military forces (Stoll 7).  In 
1804, Haiti formally became an independent nation; independence, however, would 
only last for a relatively short period of time.  The triumph of the slaves instilled a 
deep-seeded animosity towards Haiti not only in the European elite, but in their 
American counterparts as well. 
 Both France and America proved to retain a profound grudge against 
Haiti.  In France, the embitterment came from the former plantation owners who 
received no compensation for their stolen property.  As late as 20 years after the 
Haitian Revolution, the French monarch, Charles X, still aggressively urged the 
President, Jean-Pierre Boyer, to demand reparations from Haiti.  In 1825, his wish 
came true; President Boyer ordered that Haiti pay 150 million francs in reparations.  
This stripped any hope of future independence from Haiti.  The recently established 
agrarian society could not withstand another invasion; she was still too weak.  
Therefore, Haiti agreed to pay the inordinate sum, a coerced decision that forced 
Haiti to borrow from French, German, and American banks (Farmer 66-67). From 
that point on, Haiti has remained in debt, a fragile condition that has perpetuated 
her poverty as well. 
After France reestablished her control over Haiti by creating a relationship 
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that mirrored peonage, America followed suit.  In 1776 after declaring 
independence from Britain, America allied with French forces to crush the slave 
rebellion in Haiti.  When their efforts emerged as futile, America refused to 
recognize Haitian independence until 1862, when Haiti presented an answer to, 
interestingly enough, the “Negro Question.”  At that time, America was up in arms as 
to what to do with this newly freed population.  The majority actually believed that 
these African Americans could not survive in America without slavery – they would 
die.  Therefore, logic led the government to resolve upon deportation.  Lincoln saw 
the “Black country” as a perfect location to ship freed slaves in order to absolve 
America of “blot or mixture,” as Thomas Jefferson colorfully remarked (Farmer 18).  
Thus marked the beginning of international power diplomacy sticking their hands in 
Haiti. 
Woodrow Wilson incited the first official U.S. invasion of Haiti, marking the 
beginning of a long-standing U.S. occupation of Haiti whose ramifications are still 
very apparent.  In 1914, one year before the U.S. invasion, President Wilson sent 
marines to Haiti to transfer $500,000 from the Haitian National Bank to reserves 
“for safe-keeping” in New York (Buschschluter 1).  The assassination of the Haitian 
president motivated President Wilson’s 1915 invasion of Haiti to protect U.S. 
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corporate assets.  In addition, rising German influence worried President Wilson 
who wanted to maintain full U.S. control of the region.  This objective prompted him 
to deploy U.S. troops to Haiti that remained there until President Franklin Roosevelt 
withdrew them in 1934 as part of his “Good Neighbor Policy” (Buschschluter 1).  
These troops only brought violence and horror to Haiti and left her reliant on the 
U.S. 
In 1944, as WWII was in its last stages, European powers convened to found 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  This fund would provide immediate, short-
term financial aid to enable countries that won the war to continue foreign trade.  
Simultaneously, the World Bank materialized to fund the rebuilding of Europe.  
However beneficial these institutions would prove to be, their interests only 
represented those of world powers.  At the time, these superpowers boasted large 
empires that included all nations now considered developing countries.  Therefore, 
no developing countries participated in the crafting of the IMF or the World Bank 
because no such countries existed (Life and Debt).  As a result, these international 
monetary boards grant aid in the form of Structural Adjustment Loans that function 
to reproduce a neocolonial relationship between them and the developing countries 
they are supposedly helping. 
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 The primary source of Haitian poverty and key to its elimination is the 
land, “in its ruined countryside” (Stoll 7).  Before the U.S. occupation of Haiti, which 
was spearheaded by Woodrow Wilson, Haiti had established her own constitution 
that consisted of many land reforms.  These included prohibiting any white person 
from owning land and redistributing plantation properties for small farms.  With 
these provision grounds, as they were called, former slaves could put to use 
techniques of self-sufficient farming planters had taught them.  Though required to 
keep production costs low, self-sufficiency in agriculture allowed Haiti to survive 
after cutting ties with European powers.  Already experts at managing the volcanic 
soils and ample rainfall, the free Haitians masterfully cultivated cassava, dasheen, 
breadfruit, yams, and rice, just like they had done previously as slaves (Stoll 7).  
Expanding their local market to include plantains, bananas, and coffee, Haitian 
farmers proficiently fed their country. 
For developing countries, accepting aid from the IMF results in a vicious 
cycle of dependency.  These powerful institutions regard recession and depression 
in poor countries as evidence of the countries’ inability to govern themselves and 
control extravagant government spending (Gros 975).  In February of 1980, the 
World Bank started instituting Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), also known as 
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Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs).  Under the pretext of fear incited by the 1979 
oil scare, the World Bank contended that SALs would prevent countries importing 
oil from being hurt by rising oil prices and therefore being unable to devote as much 
money to development (975).  In reality, these SALs can be viewed as a Trojan 
horse; though providing immediate finances, these loans work to reinforce the 
World Banks and IMF’s control over developing countries as these countries amass 
huge debt and therefore must come back for more, so to speak. 
Since 1986, Haitians have adopted the term “l’insécurité” to portray the 
intermittent spikes of political turbulence, crime, and economic collapse as the 
government attempts to consolidate democracy while in a state of massive debt.  
This process has significantly debilitated labor, general income levels, gender 
relations, and overall nutrition among Haitians, while contributing to an increase in 
technological and environmental hazards particularly precarious for a fragile nation 
such as Haiti (James).   Foreign aid is largely responsible for Haiti’s political, social 
and economical unrest, as much of it comes from neoliberal institutions that seek to 
expand the global market, with its inherent fluctuations and periodic crises, instead 
of stabilizing a developing country. 
Since the 1980s, the U.S. has colluded with the IMF and World Bank to enact 
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neoliberal policies in Haiti (Gros 975).  In the early 1980s, Haiti began receiving 
pressure from international institutions like the IMF and World Bank to liberalize 
their economy (Devienne 16). The immense sway of these institutions became 
especially apparent in Haiti in 1994 when President Aristide returned from exile.  
After the first ousting of the president, the U.S. struck a deal with the Haitian 
politician.  They would bring him back into power if her promised to institute a few 
economic policies, one of these being the virtual destruction of foreign tariffs.  
Tariffs on U.S. goods dropped to 3% and almost instantaneously imports 
skyrocketed into Haiti (Lindsay 23).  President Préval, Aristide’s successor, 
recognized the need to repair Haitian agriculture; self-sufficient farming could once 
again feed the country.  He collaborated, so to speak, with the IMF to establish an 
economic plan that would boast higher investment in agriculture.  Yet, massive debt 
to the IMF, World Bank, and other international institutions stifled the desired 
outcome of this legislation.  3.5% of the budget was allotted to agriculture, only a 
fraction of the amount dedicated to repaying debt.  This debt prevents any 
significant economic growth and prevents Haiti from achieving independence. 
In 1986 Haitian agriculture shifted dramatically at the influx of rice imports.  
Agriculture has historically been the primary source of employment and revenue for 
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Haiti, employing roughly 70% of workers and accounting for 26% of GDP in 2008 
(Le Secteur Agricole en Haïti 1, Devienne 16).  The principal crops produced are 
coffee, cacao, sugar cane, rice, sorghum, sisal, legumes, and corn.  Those that 
dominate exports, however, are coffee, sugar cane, cacao, sisal, and fruits, especially 
mango. Ten national “Départements” of food production constitute Haiti’s 
agricultural sector.  They encapsulate every geographical region, the north, the 
northwest, the south, the east, etc.  One of these departments is the ancient 
Artibonite Valley that is devoted to rice production.  Rewarded the nickname “le 
Grenier d’Haïti,” or the breadbasket of Haiti, this Valley allowed Haiti to be 
sovereign – it provided a central source of nourishment to keep the country self-
sufficient (Le Secteur Agricole en Haiti).  The Artibonite Valley spans across 45,000 
hectares, 28,000 of which are devoted to rice irrigation and cultivation.  75% of 
Haitian rice originates here, around 67,500 tons.   The Artibonite Valley is also the 
largest national producer of onions, shallots, garlic, and eggplant.  After rice imports 
skyrocketed, however, domestic rice cultivation deteriorated significantly, naturally 
followed by a serious slump in rural employment and GDP. 
Haitian-grown rice now accounts for merely 20% of national rice 
consumption, making Haiti extremely vulnerable to global price fluctuations. Rice 
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imports actually come from 20 countries, of which the U.S. supplies the most (70-
80%) (Le Secteur Agricole en Haiti 1).  30,000 metric tons of rice is imported into 
Haiti monthly, an annual expenditure of around $270 million.  This continues while 
local production decreases and prices increase.  A bag of rice doubled in cost from 
January to June 2008, though remained slightly cheaper than local rice due to heavy 
U.S. subsidies (Gauthier 2).  A bag of rice worth 750 gourdes in winter rose to more 
than 1150 gourdes in the summer (from 20 to more than 30 dollars) (Le Secteur 
Agricole en Haiti 1).  In April 2008, after the beginning of the farming season in 
March, the government decided to subsidize the price of imported rice by 9%.  
Though providing a temporal solution for urban dwellers, this subsidy does little for 
long-term poverty in Haiti, which originates in Haiti’s lack of agricultural self-
sustainability.  Haitian farmers continue to use antiquated and inefficient machinery 
they cannot afford to replace while a great deal of arable land is dedicated to bio-
fuel crops, both contributing to food shortages and higher prices as a result of 
increased demand.  Fertilizer proves to be too expensive to buy so farmers cannot 
properly replenish their soil after each harvest, which can lead to poor future 
harvests (Gauthier 2).  This problem subsists because Haitian farmers barely gross 
enough profit to feed themselves let alone invest in modern machinery as well as 
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fertilizer.  Therefore, Haitian farmers seem to be at an impasse while the general 
public continues to starve (Devienne 16, Le Secteur Agricole 1). 
The advent of rice imports marked a drastic fall in the annual income of 
Haitian rice farmers.  In 2008, a rice farmer had to spend over half of their earnings 
on rice.   Rising food prices have caused immense impoverishment all across Haiti 
where 80% of Haitians currently live in poverty (Devienne 16).  This has led to the 
“Clorox” hunger phenomenon.  This hunger is defined by a sensation that resembles 
that of swallowing bleach or battery acid (Lindsay 23, Stoll 10).   Many Haitians have 
taken to eating mud biscuits, which consist of a bit of oil, some salt, and mud.  
Though devoid of significant nutrition, these biscuits manage to fill up the stomachs 
of many Haitians, of whom six out of ten “cannot count on even one square meal a 
day” (Gauthier 2).  The mud biscuit phenomenon emerged notably as a result of two 
variables.  Firstly, the stark climb in rice prices rendered the staple overwhelmingly 
unaffordable.  Secondly, in November and December of 2008, two intense storms hit 
Haiti and ruined the harvests of countless farmers (Etwareea 1).  This shift to using 
earth not just for farming but also for immediate satiation demonstrates a shocking 
level of poverty that humanitarian aid has not yet remedied. 
Haitians who live in rice bowl of Haiti, the Artibonite Valley, represent the 
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most impoverished and starving (NPR).  Though handling rice everyday, they cannot 
eat what they can sell.  Rice cultivating families now struggle to feed themselves, not 
to mention send their children to school.  Consequently, rural Haiti has experienced 
a drop in the amount of children attending school, for which the government 
provides no aid.  Those who are fortunate enough to attend school are perpetually 
hungry because school has no money to provide lunches.  An annual school fee 
generally adds up to around $45, but the majority of families pay nothing (NPR).  
This drop in education after Structural Adjustment Loans and other forms of 
international intervention is not unique to Haiti, however.  In Jamaica, these loans 
have prohibited the government from funding education and agricultural 
development, weakening the country even more (Life and Debt).  The negative effect 
on school attendance must not be overlooked when assessing the effects of foreign 
aid. 
Though aid continues to flow to Haiti, it is distributed unequally, rural areas 
frequently receiving nothing. “U.S. food aid—bound by requirements that U.S. 
assistance earmarked for food be based on the “donation” of U.S.-produced food 
delivered by U.S. shipping companies—is either given out to the poor (as direct food 
assistance) or sold by NGOs to support their overhead and operating costs (a 
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process known as monetization),” (Partners in Health 1).  Therefore, though aid can 
help those in need, it can also just as easily function to further corporate goals, doing 
little to actually solidify Haiti in the world market.  A great deal of aid undermines 
Haiti’s agricultural sector, the backbone of the country.  This ensures Haiti’s future 
reliance on the donor country or institution that can then expand their industry.  In 
1982, the U.S. virtually started the attack on rural Haiti through the extermination of 
Haitian Creole pigs.  Under the Reagan administration, the U.S. found a strain of 
swine flu in these pigs that presented an extreme risk of infection to Haitian 
farmers.  Though the illness existed, the solution of killing all Creole pigs seemed to 
be rather extreme, as these extremely well adapted pigs played a crucial role for 
85% of rural households.   Two years after the local pigs were exterminated, the U.S. 
began to ship pigs from Iowa to Haiti.  Haitian peasants are estimated to have lost up 
to $600 million, which was followed by a 30% decrease in enrollment in rural 
schools.  The Creole pigs also constituted a high source of protein for peasants, but 
with the new pigs, that tasted worse and whose breeding necessitated more 
attention and resources, consumption of protein plummeted.  To top it all off, the 
peasant economy crumbled as a result of further soil degradation (Aristide 12-15).  
Of course, as Gauthier indicates, donors like the U.S., who make hundreds of millions 
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off of exports to Haiti, do not want Haiti to actually become self-sufficient (2).  That 
would jeopardize a major source of business. In 2007, Haiti imported approximately 
$112 million of rice from the U.S.  In 2008 that number rose to $270 million 
(Gauthier 2).  A fundamental problem emerges if the institutions upon whom Haiti 
continues to rely for aid do not actually have Haiti’s interests in mind.  
More recently, Haiti has experienced widespread riots protesting a 
consistent lack of access to food and demanding the expulsion of U.S. goods from 
Haiti.  At Aristide’s return to power, the IMF and World Bank said importing rice 
would actually benefit the poor because the newly-unemployed peasants could 
move to the city and sell their labor to “American assembly plants to make textiles 
and electronics for export” (Lindsay 23).  Yet, this has deepened Haitian dependency 
and heightened her vulnerability to price fluctuations in the global market.  4.5 
million Haitians continue to scrape by on less than a dollar a day (Lindsay 22).  
Initially, rice imports were banned in Haiti and considered part of the black market.  
They incited attacks from angry peasants and as a result, the government stationed 
soldiers in Artibonite Valley to monitor these uprisings (Lindsay 23).  Yet the riots 
continue and have magnified in their intensity.  In Les Cayes, for example, in early 
April 2008, protesters of rising food prices clashed with “peacekeepers” and 
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knocked down the walls of a UN military base.  Often ending violently, these riots 
have led to a heightened public vigilance of efforts to further destabilize the 
government by drug traffickers or opponents of René Préval, Haiti’s president until 
May 2011.  External institutions can largely be blamed for the loss of economic and 
political authority necessary to control these riots, allowing for a deeper sense of 
instability in Haiti (Gros 975).  
The key to Haiti’s recovery lies in a recommitment to agriculture.  The 
neoliberal forces that have advocated for Haiti’s complete immersion in the global 
market have in actuality worked to reify Haiti’s deeply rooted dependence on such 
forces.  Self-sufficient farming must reemerge as the primary method of farming and 
a pragmatic livelihood. 
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CHAPTER 3:  A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND ITS ROLE IN 
HAITI 
Humanitarian has evolved as a practice ever since it was first realized after 
World War II.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines the adjective “humanitarian” 
as “concerned with humanity as a whole; spec. seeking to promote human welfare as 
a primary or pre-eminent good; acting, or disposed to act, on this basis rather than 
for pragmatic or strategic reasons (chiefly depreciative in early use, with the 
implication of excessive sentimentality),” (“Humanitarian”).  In 1944, as WWII was 
in its last stages, the department of foreign aid within the government began with 
founding of found the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  European powers 
convened to establish a fund that would provide immediate, short-term financial aid 
to enable countries that won the war to continue foreign trade.  Simultaneously, the 
World Bank materialized to fund the rebuilding of Europe.  However beneficial 
these institutions would prove to be, their interests only represented those of world 
economic powers.  At the time, the concept of “developing countries” did not yet 
exist; therefore, no developing country participated in the crafting of the IMF or the 
World Bank (Life and Debt).  As a result, these international monetary boards that 
grant aid in the form of financial loans serve to reproduce a global neoimperialistic 
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hierarchy. 
After WWII, the United Nations convened to establish the Charter, followed 
soon after by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The end of WWII also 
marked a shift in global politics in which the United States emerged as “sovereign.”  
With this supreme status, “American Exceptionalism” came to define U.S. foreign 
policy (Chomsky).  International law existed, but the United States deemed 
themselves exempt from its jurisdiction. 
USAID emerged after WWII and remains a prominent player in global 
humanitarian aid politics.  The government agency’s origins lie in the optimistic and 
rather idealistic belief that the U.S. could resolve the world’s problems abroad as 
well as at home.  George Marshall’s 1947 Harvard commencement speech marked 
the birth, so to speak, of “international development assistance” (Schuller 139).  
Established by the Kennedy administration in 1961 at the height of the Cold War, 
USAID molded out of a fear of communism. President Kennedy placed the new 
“humanitarian aid” agency under the auspices of the State Department.  
Controversial from its beginning, the new humanitarian agency differed from the 
Marshall Plan before it.  Bipartisan support for the organization relied upon the 
argument that it was a sagacious investment, one that Representative Udall of 
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Arizona at the time described as “a program that sets out to combat the forces of 
extreme poverty and political oppression which are the best possible breeding 
ground for Communism” (140).  Therefore, the Kennedy administration launched 
USAID under the pretext of protecting vulnerable people from themselves.   
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in 1989 jeopardized 
the legitimacy of humanitarian international development and therefore the very 
foundations of USAID (Schuller 143).  The Bush Sr. administration, however, 
resolved to keep humanitarian intervention as part of U.S. foreign policy, which 
elicited the preservation of U.S.’s immense military force under revised grounds.  
The United States should be able to protect themselves from “technologically 
advanced third world countries and maintain the power to intervene in the Middle 
East,” a potential threat.  At the time, there was no international “right” to 
humanitarian intervention, a formality the U.S. disregarded by declaring that 
In a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to global order and the 
norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too 
great for the legality of unilateral preventive action as distinct from 
collectively endorsed action from the security council for it to be accepted 
allowing one to act would allow all. 
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The U.N. world summit later endorsed the right to humanitarian intervention 
despite the objections from perpetual victims of U.S. dominance.   Humanitarian 
intervention now provided the grounds for the stronger global powers, mainly the 
U.S., to invade countries under the pretext of protecting human rights.  USAID, the 
figurehead of humanitarian intervention, adopted a new ideology.  The agency now 
sought to advance the “U.S. national interest,” an extremely vague and changeable 
political imperative (146).  Haiti’s political and social volatility largely stems from 
inconsistent USAID policies and funding as a result of fiercely partisan politics in 
Washington. 
 Though still hiding under a guise of honesty and selflessness, USAID 
continues to be political.  However, as Schuller notes, the “grafting of foreign policy 
objectives onto aid programs lends foreign aid a political character, making it a 
space for contests over how the national interest is defined” (Schuller 141).  Zizek 
would agree, arguing that humanitarian aid is guided by ideology.  
  It often transpires that the donor country dictates what the receiving 
country needs without consulting them.  In the case of rice, the U.S. decided that 
Haiti needed food in the form of rice, a political choice that would benefit the U.S., 
more specifically Arkansas rice farmers, in the long term while only increasing 
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Haitian debt.  This is very similar to how the IMF maintains control over the 
countries they lend money to.  The IMF always stipulates how the money shall or 
shall not be used.  This is not aid and ends up belittling the receiving country, 
reinforcing a neocolonial structure.  The “savages” aren’t fit to run their own 
country so we will do it for them, and because they’re so dumb, we will get rich off 
of their raw materials or just make them dependant on us so we stay rich and get 
richer. 
For developing countries, accepting aid from the IMF results in a vicious 
cycle of dependency.  These powerful institutions regard recession and depression 
in poor countries as evidence of the countries’ inability to govern themselves and 
control extravagant government spending (Gros 975).  In February of 1980, the 
World Bank started instituting Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), also known as 
Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs).  Under the pretext of fear incited by the 1979 
oil scare, the World Bank contended that SALs would prevent countries importing 
oil from being hurt by rising oil prices and therefore being unable to devote as much 
money to development (975).  In reality, these SALs can be viewed as a Trojan 
horse; though providing immediate finances, these loans work to reinforce the 
World Banks and IMF’s control over developing countries as these countries amass 
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huge debt and therefore must come back for more, so to speak. 
SAPs have consistently failed, not just in Haiti.  This is in large part due to the 
time gap in between the securing of the loan and its repayment. The repayment on 
the loan is generally within three to five years; so often times, the governmental 
administration that received the loan is not the same one to repay it.  “Through 
structural adjustment lending the banks simply require that certain policies be 
implemented as a condition for budget support in hard currency.  No one is 
responsible for producing any proof that the policies implemented have produced 
returns necessary to repay the loan… The funds lent as structural adjustment 
programs become ‘pork barrel’ spending because they are not tied to concrete 
objectives,” (10-11).  For this reason, the money often disappears, commandeered 
by corrupt agencies seeking to further privatize Haiti, in the process coincidentally 
fostering the IMF and World Bank’s neoliberal sentiments.  
A 1988 report found in the USAID archives, the Hamilton-Gilman Report, 
revealed, “the public has very little concept of the aid programs as an instrument of 
foreign policy used to advance U.S. interests,” (Schuller 146).  This illustrates Slavoj 
Zizek’s claim that humanitarian aid relies upon the neoimperialistic notion of 
human rights that bear the façade of working for human good instead of political 
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power. 
Among the family of international development groups, USAID allocates the 
most grant aid.  For example, in 2004, USAID provided more than $23 billion in FY 
while the European Commission gave around $9 billion (Schuller 138).  It seems 
ironic to note USAID’s location in the Ronald Regan Building, a strikingly modern 
edifice and “reflection of neoliberal ethos of privatization and erosion of public 
space,” (139).   The juxtaposition of the global political economic market and a 
supposedly depoliticized agency seems to be suspicious. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE GENERAL EFFECTS OF RICE AID ON RURAL HAITIAN 
SOCIETY 
Since the 1980s when the Reagan administration uncovered a swine fever 
epidemic among Haitian hogs, the United States has taken to exporting pigs’ ears to 
Haiti.  The undesirable body part, devoid of much fatty flesh, serves as a constant 
reminder to Haitians of the United States’ deception and brutal interference in Haiti.  
In her article, “Women, Sabotaj, and Underground Food Economies in Haiti,” Myron 
Beasley exposes the popular animosity surrounding food aid that often functions to 
boost the donor country or institution’s morale while falling short of adequately 
aiding the receiving countries.  She speaks to Aimee, a woman street-food vendor on 
a corner in Port-au-Prince, selling items from a box.  Examining the box and its 
contents, Beasley is intrigued by some delicious-looking fried bits she cannot 
identify.  “’They are pig ears,’” Aimee responds.  “’This is what the U.S. sends to us 
because you don’t eat them there… You know how we feel about your pig!’ she says 
with disgust in her eyes,” (Beasley 33).   
The story of pigs’ ears illustrates the notion of the wealthy giving what they 
no longer want to the poor.  This can also be applied to human rights.  Rancière’s 
theory of unwanted rights sent to developing countries fits in perfectly here.  Those 
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receiving the pigs’ ears or human rights most often do not want them and eventually 
push them away.  It is a vicious cycle, however, because the wealthy countries will 
come in as if it is their duty to reinstall these prescribed “human rights” when really 
they are only acting to secure their global authority once again.  This concept helps 
explicate how the economic structure relating to food imposed by the IMF and 
World Bank does not work in the Caribbean and has led to many problems.  
Aristide’s political ethos during his first interrupted presidency embodied a 
contradiction: on one hand Aristide represented the first politician that could 
vocalize the needs and wants of the Haitian poor majority.  As a Father, Aristide 
fervently supported the liberation theology, especially its “option for the poor” 
doctrine, which inspired him to advocate for a more democratically just Haiti in 
which poor Haitians could participate. “On the other hand, those same theological 
views of politics led him to see himself as a prophetic, charismatic leader who has a 
direct, symbiotic relationship with the “prophetic” people and who could interpret 
their needs, interests, and aspirations without mediating organization such as 
political parties with clearly defined rules of governance and accountability between 
leaders and their constituents,” (Dupuy xiv).  Dupuy challenges Aristide’s 
commitment to his promises of his election campaigns, a commitment made 
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difficult, however, by the global financial institutions.   
Since the 1980s, the U.S. has colluded with the IMF and World Bank to enact 
neoliberal policies in Haiti (Gros 975).  In the early 1980s, Haiti began receiving 
pressure from international institutions like the IMF and World Bank to liberalize 
their economy (Devienne 16).  After the coup removing Baby Doc from power, 
former President George H.W. Bush only added to Haiti’s fragility by backing faulty 
economic sanctions that generated mass migration to the cities, strengthened the 
wealthy Haitians’ power in involving Haiti in the international drug trade, and 
provoked a mass exodus from Haiti to the United States in the image of racialized 
“boat people,” (Schuller 157).  During the election in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
was elected, the Bush Sr. administration spent $12 million of public dollars to 
support U.S.’s choice candidate, Marc Bazin.  The World Bank finds no fault in the 
use of public funds for foreign elections, asserting that a win could prove to be 
immensely useful for gaining access to the foreign government.  If the funded 
candidate loses, however, public funds have been squandered (Schuller 157).  The 
sway of these financial institutions, spearheaded by the U.S., became especially 
apparent in Haiti under the Clinton administration. 
In 1994 President Aristide’s returned from exile at the hands of the U.S. 
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military.  Before resuming his role as president, however, Aristide had to make an 
extremely difficult decision.  The military junta that controlled Haiti between 
Aristide’s first ousting and his return committed mass murder due to their own 
paramilitary organization.  Wanting to stop the killing of tens of thousands of his 
supporters, Aristide resolved to accept the stipulations outlined by the U.S. in 
exchange for bringing him back to power (Schuller 158).  Among these policies was 
the virtual destruction of foreign tariffs.  Tariffs on U.S. goods dropped to 3% and 
almost instantaneously imports skyrocketed into Haiti, precipitating the slump in 
the Haitian rice market (Lindsay 23). 
President Préval, Aristide’s successor, recognized the need to repair Haitian 
agriculture; self-sufficient farming could once again feed the country.  He 
collaborated, so to speak, with the IMF to establish an economic plan that would 
boast higher investment in agriculture.  Yet, massive debt to the IMF, World Bank, 
and other international institutions stifled the desired outcome of this legislation.  
3.5% of the budget was allotted to agriculture, only a fraction of the amount 
dedicated to repaying debt.  This debt prevents any significant economic growth and 
prevents Haiti from achieving actual independence. 
 Food security, Mamadou Baro argues, is crucial in the establishment of a 
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stable, thriving nation.  An illusive term, food security precipitates self-sufficiency 
and thus autonomy.  He classifies food security as concerning the economy, the 
environment, and the quest for democratic government.  “Food insecurity prevents 
people from being economically active citizens because they lack the simple physical 
energy needed to contribute fully to their own livelihood… the lack of food leads to 
the over-exploitation of marginal land, the misuse of water supplies, the exhaustion 
of soils, and deforestation… the pursuit of democracy is hampered when basic 
human needs are not met,” (Baro 20).  As long as rice remains out of Haitians’ 
control, these three factors will deteriorate. 
Over the past three decades, the international institutions responsible for 
taking over “reconstruction” of developing countries have used the same 
techniques, none of which have proven successful, that is, successful in the sense of 
making the developing country more self-reliant.  These methods consist of two 
recurring objectives that do more to reinforce Haiti’s reliance on external support 
than to render her a stronger nation.  The first targets Haitian labor and seeks to 
transform it into the cheapest within the Caribbean so the price of exports, 
overwhelmingly to the U.S., remains low.  The second is more complex and has 
worked to destroy Haitian agriculture.  In the 1980s, Haiti produced upwards of 
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80% of her food; in 2011 that figure dropped to 42% (Goodman).  Under Former 
President Clinton, rice, a staple in the Haitian diet, went from being entirely 
domestically produced to nearly all imported, primarily from heavily subsidized 
farms in Arkansas.  
The international community continues to act with their interests in mind, 
failing to consult the Haitian government and propagating a paternalistic 
relationship with Haiti.  Now considered the “Republic of NGOs,” Haiti lacks a strong 
central government necessary to establish some sort of sustainable infrastructure 
(Goodman).  After the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship, international donor 
institutions funded the creation of NGOs that would meet the needs of the people 
that the Haitian government had perpetually failed to meet.  Yet, in reality, NGOs 
have prevented any significant nationwide progress from occurring due to the 
hundreds of groups that boast some sort of authority.  In addition, many NGOs 
receive funding from international donor agencies, so they are, in that sense, more 
powerful than the central government currently is (Goodman, Schuller).  Dupuy 
concedes that the Haitian government historically has fallen short of providing for 
the poor majority, but emphasizes that funding NGOs rather than working with the 
Haitian government itself only magnifies this problem.  He attributes the current 
Potter 41 
condition of Haiti in which the “basic needs and basic rights” of the poor majority 
remain unanswered to the international community as well as Haitian elites (Dupuy 
1997). 
The international community has a history of working with the Haitian elites 
rather than the Haitian government, which three decades ago, was composed of and 
crafted for the Haitian elite.  Now those that can flee have fled and the international 
community has continued to provide “aid,” which has hurt rather than helped Haiti 
as a state and the poor majority as a neglected population. 
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THE EFFECT ON THE “POTO MITAN” OF HAITI, THE WOMEN: 
Poor women and children are those primarily affected by economic 
downturn.  With rising poverty, income gaps continue to widen while gendered 
labor undergoes a shift (Correia 35). In 1999, Haiti’s total population equaled 
around eight million, about two-thirds of which lived in rural regions (39).  The 
World Bank, in their assessment of gender in the Caribbean, reports that of 
developing countries, Haiti has one of the highest Economically Active Population 
rates (EAP) in which 62% of women work.  They also note that rural Haiti is plagued 
with a “stagnant under-productive agricultural sector, [a] lack of basic 
infrastructure and services, … extensive environmental degradation, …fuel 
shortages and a lack of piped water,” but omit to mention their shortcomings that 
influenced this disaster (39).  They do indicate, however, that household duties 
primarily carried out by women are more arduous because of these structural 
inefficiencies (36).  The burden placed on women to fulfill tasks in and out of the 
household has increased in the last 30 years, in large part due to internal and 
international migration aggravated by the interruption in the Haitian rice market. 
One of the sources of increased pressure on women derives from migration.  
Women and men tend to demonstrate different migrating patterns. For both sexes, 
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however, migration follows potential employment.  Women often migrate internally 
to the city to pursue domestic work or factory jobs in “export-processing zones” 
while men tend to migrate internationally for seasonal jobs (Correia 39).   This has 
led to an increase in woman-run households heavily reliant upon remittances sent 
back from their husbands or other male family members (Sassen 2).  Between 1990 
and 1997 approximately 200,000 Haitians (about four % of the total population) 
migrated to the U.S.  Women migrants receive much worse treatment and overall 
fewer rights than their male counterparts, notably in the Dominican Republic where 
the majority of migrants head.  The National Coalition for Haitian Rights published 
that, in the Dominican Republic, women are not “legally permitted to work on sugar 
can plantations and are not eligible to receive housing, health care and other social 
services, and are often subjected to sexual violence” (Correia 39).  New migration 
behavior has influenced the rural society and household leadership.  
Though the effects of food insecurity largely fall on the woman, they also 
destroy the environment, as explained by Mamadou Baro earlier.  In the absence of 
men, women must strive even harder to support their families.  Without rice to sell 
at city markets, women have increasingly resorted to selling wood, charcoal, and 
labor in the Dominican Republic or overseas.  The two former sources of income 
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emerge out of the hope to make a profit in an era of constant energy shortages 
(Correia 53).  Charcoal is cheaper than oil whose price forever climbs making the 
demand for charcoal ever steeper.  As many men leave to attempt to earn 
remittances to send back to their families, women do what they can to make money.  
The problem, however, is that the constant collection of charcoal and wood leads to 
environmental degradation which results in poorer farming land and fewer 
sustainable options for already poor farmers to rely upon for their future livelihood. 
The inability of the land to hold up against natural disasters causes many 
families to be displaced, among them many previously women-led households.  As 
rural migration grows to cities, overpopulation transpires allowing a natural 
disaster to be ever more disastrous.  In the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, approximately 
230,000 Haitians were killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.5 million displaced (Assistance 
Mortelle).  Women generally represent the population labeled as the “vulnerable 
group” that needs “special help,” yet their central role in rebuilding communities is 
often overlooked by aid organizations (Palmer 236).  
In rural Haiti, households form in response to economic and social 
conditions.  They are fluid, often changing seasonally. Most unions are not ones 
recognized under the law so they can easily break and form (Correia 40). Multiple 
Potter 45 
types of unions between men and women exist, but “cohabitation” is the most 
common.  In this union, women generally remain in the house while men earn an 
income and enjoy greater authority in the relationship (Correia 36). As noted in 
Gender in the Caribbean, there has been an influx of men who have migrated either 
to the Dominican Republic or overseas to attempt at earning more money to send 
back to their homes in the form of remittances.  When this happens, women 
improvise to compensate for a loss in consistent income.  The incidence of American 
rice imports to Haiti has contributed to a similar situation where rural women have 
been forced to carry a greater burden to provide for themselves and their children.  
Women disproportionately bear the brunt of their households’ workloads.  They 
“are entirely responsible for the household economy, organizing the family, raising 
children, working in the fields and gardens; and that 90 per cent are involved in 
some sort of commercial enterprise, and spend most of the day at the market which 
they reach on foot or by donkey” (N’Zengou-Tayo 124). 
Fertility is higher in rural areas, but on average not by too much (42).  
Though virtually every Haitian mother (96%) breastfeeds their child, the need to 
generate income impels them to cease doing so, often after less than three months.  
The introduction of other liquids and solid foods renders an infant markedly more 
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prone to infectious diseases and death (41-2).  In addition, the health care received 
by rural Haitian women falls short of their needs.  In order to survive, pregnant 
women often work up until they go into labor, which frequently leads to nutritional 
anemia (N’Zengou-Tayo 121).  These examinations shed light on health effects on 
women in grave poverty who must care for their children while heading the 
household at the same time. 
The Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Women’s Rights (Ministère à la 
Conditions Féminine et aux Droits de la Femme) is the main body in Haitian 
government that arbitrates the political status of women.  However, due to the 
“weakness of government agencies,” international institutions like UNICEF, USAID, 
and UNDP have interfered to try and remedy the inequalities women still face.  They 
have “played a key role in further addressing gender issues in Haiti” (37).  Despite 
their efforts, women have had very little political representation, only accounting 
for four percent of local authorities and deputies between 1997 and 1999 (38).  In 
addition to international institutions, private and NGO sectors play a large role in 
the distribution of health, education and other areas that the public sector cannot 
afford to address (37). They often target rural Haiti that primarily abides by 
customary rules rather Civil/Statute Law (38).  Though increasingly bearing the 
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burden of earning a living, women have not enjoyed a proportional rise in political 
representation. 
As women struggle to sell rice, the prospect of sending their children to 
school diminishes significantly, especially for the young peasant girls.  “When 
resources are scarce, girls have less chance of getting an education,” (Palmer 237).  
As school has become less of a priority in rural Haiti, girls at around the ages of 8 or 
9 are expected to start their household apprenticeships.  This consists of helping 
with their younger siblings, fetching water, assisting in cooking and marketing.  For 
boys, age 10 marks the point when they will start helping their fathers in the fields.  
A widespread lack of school attendance in rural Haiti primarily derives from the 
unaffordable school fees, largely a consequence of failed SAPs.  Furthermore, 
children are needed in the house and fields to help out, making attending school 
practically unviable.  Caring for younger children or collecting water make a 
substantial difference for parents (N’Zengou-Tayo 120). 
Presently, young peasant girls are sent by their families to bigger cities to 
work as domestic servants.  When they are young they work lower middle class 
families gradually progressing, as they grow older, to upper middle class families.   
Though planned, these jobs are considered temporary, useful only for accruing 
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enough capital to launch an enterprise (Correia 127).  Violence against women is a 
regular threat facing domestic workers, and a means of repression used by the state 
against women across classes” (N’Zengou-Tayo 118).  However, women’s 
organizations have gained a great deal more of acknowledgement in the years since 
Baby Doc’s dictatorship crumbled.  This has precipitated a greater focus on gender 
inequality in Haiti, especially within the realm of education and labor (119). 
Historically, rural women have been extremely politically active.  During the 
time of military rule after the fall of the Duvalier regime, rural women repeatedly 
attempted to organize themselves.  A community of women radically started their 
own garden that they farmed on and harvested from themselves (125).  However, 
with the severe and persistent lack of infrastructure, water, and farmable land, 
women have been unable to maintain a livelihood off of the land on their own.  
Consequently, many women have migrated to the city where they can work 
domestically or in garment factories for international corporations.  These women 
often come to the city with little to no money and multiple children, a critical 
situation that often leads women to prostitute themselves.  City migrants rarely find 
job security; that is to say, their newly established livelihoods are very fragile.  Any 
unpredictable event, such as illness or political revolts in addition to a lack of 
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professional experience can end a woman’s career.  Though the life of a peasant 
woman may seem rather grim, there have been efforts made to aid women in 
overcoming “economic and historical invisibility,” such as the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, Enfofanm, Kayfanm, as well as numerous grassroots women’s rights groups 
(126). 
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CH. 5: A CALLING FOR A RE-POLITICIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN AID: A 
CONCLUSION: 
As I was doing this research, I became ever more skeptical of U.S. foreign 
policy and humanitarian aid in general.  One of the central problems with 
humanitarian intervention, however, is the implication that the donor country is 
past persecuting or ignoring their citizens. Yet, in the case of the U.S., this is blatantly 
not true.  Hurricane Katrina brought to light the inability of the U.S. to help its own 
citizens.  Furthermore, as humanitarian aid remained depoliticized in the global 
schema, at home in the States, domestic humanitarian aid quickly became political, 
as the people who desperately needed aid and weren’t receiving it were 
predominantly people of color.  
“The realization of the right to food” is a complicated phrase (Partners in 
Health 3).  Humans require sustenance to survive; that is to say, humans need to eat 
and drink water to survive.  Yet, if this were a true “right,” so to speak, wouldn’t 
everyone have access to it?  Haitians right to food has been ignored, but so has that 
of many Americans.  Nevertheless, institutions invoke the notion of human rights 
when talking about a country that doesn’t have ‘rights’ like U.S. citizens do.  Human 
rights appear again and again as the rights that we should afford the needy because 
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we already possess them. 
The purpose of my thesis is not to offer a solution to hunger or political 
instability in Haiti, but to promote a rethinking of the concept of humanitarian 
intervention/aid.   Slavoj Zizek deeply influenced me after I read his “Against Human 
Rights” which connected the theoretical dots in my mind.  Just as Zizek demands the 
recognition of the ideology implicit in the notion of human rights and by extension 
humanitarian aid, I hope to emphasize that shift in thinking by showing the 
consequences of a specific case of humanitarian aid that was carried out by officials 
either ignorant or consciously greedy officials.  A subscription to universalism is 
inherent in the idea of human rights that dictates that humans outside of politics are 
merely animals with rudimentary needs, desires, and, of course, rights.  Rancière 
argues this not to be the case and I completely agree.  If politics are removed from 
the discourse surrounding humanitarian intervention and human rights, then the 
poor will remain the poor as long as the rich desire.
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